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I.
An interesting problem is presented in several recent cases.
How far, if at all, is one man bound, being able to do so
without serious inconvenience to himself, to go out of his
way to care for those injured without any fault of his?
How far is he bound to extricate another from a perilous
position? How far must he act, if at all, to mitigate the
consequences of an injury, where be is personally free from
all fault? It is curious to find that many text writers flatly
assert the existence of such a duty, at least in those cases
where the harm or peril has been caused by some act of the
defendant, even though that act be legally innocent. 2 This
doctrine is so opposed to the normal attitude of common
law, and to the statements thereof, generally it is true by
'Shaw v. R. R., II4 N. NV., 8 5 (Minn., 19o8); Raasch v. Elite Laun-
dry Co., 98 Minn.; Whitesides v. R. R., 128 N. C., 229; Cappier v. R. R.,
66 Kansas, 649, 69 L R. A., S3, and Prospert v. Suburban Railway Co.,
67 Atl. R., 552 (R. I., June 27, 19o7).
*Beach on Contributory Negligence, Sec. 215; Thompson on Negli-
gence, vol. iR, sec. z744.
TIE MORAL DUTY TO AID OTHERS
way of dictum, of so many eminent judges,3 that it is
necessary to examine the decided cases to see whether they
afford any authority in favor, first, of a general duty to act
as a good Samaritan; or, sccond, whether innocent but in-
jurious action entails upon the actor a duty to remove as
far as possible the injury which he has caused; or, third,
whether again, there may not be other definite classes of
circumstances or relations out of which may arise a duty of
this sort peculiar to themselves.
There is one class of cases 4 often cited and which may at
first glance seem to support a duty of active care and pro-
tection based upon the helpless peril of him who claims it.
'Among others the statement of Willes, J., in Gautret v. Egerton,
L. R., 2 C. P. 371: "No action will lie against a spiteful man, who see-
ing another running into a position of danger merely omits the warn-
ing." Also Mr. Justice Field in U. S. v. Knowles, 4 Sawy., 517: "It is
undoubtedly the moral duty of every person to extend to others assist-
ance when in danger." "And if such efforts should be omitted by any
one when they can be made, without imperiling his own life, he would
by his conduct draw upon himself the just censure and reproach of
good men; but this is the only punishment to which he would be sub-
jected by society." So, Carpenter, C. J., says in Buch v. Amory Co., 69
N. H., 257: "With purely moral obligations, the law does not deal.
For example, the priest and the Levite who passed by on the other side
were not, it is supposed, liable at law for the continued suffering of the
man who fell among thieves, which they might and morally ought to
have prevented or relieved. Suppose A, standing close by a railroad
sees a two-year-old babe on the track and a car approaching, He -can
easily rescue the child with entire safety to himself. And the instincts
of humanity require him to do so. If he does not, lie may perhaps
justly be styled a ruthless savage and a moral monster, but he is not
liable in damages for the child's injury or indictable under the statute
for its death.
"The most usual cases of this sort are where after a trespasser is
discovered in a helpless condition upon the tracks of a railway, an engi-
neer of one of its trains fails to take care to avoid running over him.
Tanner v. R. R., 6o Ala., 621; Spearen v. R. R., 47 Pa., 300; R. R. v.
Kelly, 35 C. C. A., 571. Of this sort is the case of Pannell v. R. R., 97
Ala., 298, often cited in support of a duty to take steps to rescue even a
trespasser from a perilous position. Here the plaintiff's intestate, being
caught between two freight cars, the yard-master seeing his peril, gave
no warning thereof to the engineer of the train and allowed it to be
operated just as though the intestate was not in danger. Here, of
course, the injury was caused by the defendant's positive misfeasance in
conducting its business without any regard to the intestate's well
recognized peril
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These are the cases which hold, tiat,-admitting that no
duty exists to anticipite the presence or peril of one tres-
passing upon one's premises or meddling with one's per-
sonal property-due regard must be taken in the owner's
operation of his business upon his premises or in the use of
his property, if the trespasser's helpless peril be known, not
to cause him harm. 5 However, the duty here is not to
take positive steps to remove the trespasser's peril nor to
mitigate or relieve any injury which he may have sustained.
They do not lay lown any duty to aid or benefit the tres-
passer; they merely require that the owner shall not by his
own action, improper because of the known peril of the
plaintiff, turn the trespasser's peril into harm, or add new
injury to that already received. Conceding the prevalence
and justice of the rule that while no duty exists to anticipate
ur gnard against the merely possible peril of one, who, with-
out the owner's permission, intrudes upon his premises or
meddles with his property, a duty does exist not to act after
knowledge of the trespasser's presence and danger is brought
home to the owner, in a way to ripen it into injury, no sup-
port can be derived from it for the contention that the law
has recognized as a legal duty the moral, ethical, and humani-
tarian obligation to aid the unfortunate.-
There is no distinction more deeply rooted in the common
law and more fundamental than that between misfeasance
and non-feasance, between active misconduct working posi-
tive injury to others and passive in action, a failure to take
positive steps to benefit others, or to protect them from
harni not 'created by any wrongful act of the defendant.
'The same conception appears to lie at the bottom of the so-called
doctrine of Last Clear Chance, applicable to cases where the plaintiff
has contributed by his conduct to his own injur'. In such case the de-
fendant, though guilty of wrongdoing, is relieved from liability, unless
he knowing, or being in duty bound to know, of the plaintiff's helpless
peril or injury, fails to take care that he may not add to it by his sub-
sequent conduct. Some of the cases cited in support of the duty to act
for the protection of the helpless are merely instances of the applica-
tion of this doctrine. Such was the case often cited, Weitzman v.
Nassau R. R., 33 App. Div. N. Y., 585; 51 N. Y. Supp., 905.
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This distinction is founded on that attitude of extreme
individualism so typical of anglo-saxon legal thought. Mis-
feasance differs from non-feasance in two respects; in the
character of the conduct complained of, and second, in the
nature of the detriment suffered in consequence thereof.
The difference between the nature of the alleged misconduct
is in theory obvious, but in practice it is not always easy to
say whether an alleged misconduct is active or passive.
There is a borderland in which the act is of a mixed char-
acter, partaking of the nature of both. 6
The difference between the results of non-feasance and
misfeasance while quite as fundamental, is much less ob-
vious. The final physical injury to the plaintiff may be
the same whether defendant's alleged misconduct is an act of
violence or a failure to protect him from the violence of
others. But, there is a point intermediate between the
plaintiff's actual harm, and the defendant's misconduct,
where its consequences are substantially different. In the
case of active misfeasance the victim is positively worse
off as a result of the wrongful act. In cases of passive in-
action plaintiff is in reality no worse off at all. His situa-
tion is unchanged; he is merely deprived of a protection
which, had it been afforded him, would have benefited
him. In the one case the defendant, by interfering with
plaintiff or his affairs, has brought a new harm upon
him, and created a ninus quantity, a positive loss. In the
other, by failing to interfere in the plaintiff's affairs, the
defendant has left him just as he was before; no better
'So, while to use an article known to be defective is palpably mis-
feasance, and while a mere failure to provide protection for those who
by one's bare permission use one's premises is plainly passive non-feas-
ance, the use of a chattel for a particular purpose without having first
ascertained whether it is. fit for such purpose is a compound of both.
There is both action, i. e., the use of the chattel and non-feasance, the
failure to perform the positive duty of inspecting it to ascertain if it be
defective, and then repairing it so as to secure the safety of those apt to
be affected thereby. Still, the final cause of whatever injury is sustained
being the use of the chattel, the tendency is to consider that the whole
constitutes an act of misfeasance.
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off, it is true, but still in no worse position; he has failed
to benefit him, but he has not caused him any new injury
nor created any new injurious situation. There is here a
loss only in the sense of an absence of a plus quantity. It is
this latter difference which in fact lies at the root of the
marked difference in liability at common law for the con-
sequences of misfeasance and non-feasance.
It may be said with some confidence that the primary con-
ception of the common law was that which regarded the indi-
vidual as competent to protect himself if not interfered with
from without.7 So, while there is a general liability recog-
nized in common law courts for the natural consequences of
all actions whose probable result will be a positive injury to
others, duties of positive action for the benefit of others are
not general to the common law, but exceptional and abnor-
mal, requiring some other basis than the mere probability
that such action is necessary to protect others from an
injurious situation not caused by any antecedent misconduct
of the defendant himself.
Now, while the duty to take active care for others is not
general in the common law, there are undoubtedly many
relations to which duties of this nature of varying stringency
do attach. It is essential to examine the true nature of
such duties and consider their proper place, if any, in the
law of tort, to ascertain the various relations to which they
attach, and the attributes which such relations possess in
common, and so, if possible, discover their underlying basis.
It is more than doubtful whether the breach of an obli-
gation to take positive beneficial action should ever have
been regarded as a true tort, so marked are the points of
diversions between it and active misconducts. It would
perhaps have been better to have confined use of the term
tort to misconducts falling within the early punitive, semi-
criminal formed writs of trespass, and to those actions on
'See J. B. Ames in Harvard L R.: F. H. Bohlen, 44 An Law
Reg., 213-15; 2oth H. L R., 14-15; 21 H. L R., 252.
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the case which have broadened and extended the field of
active misconduct by an application to new facts and con-
ditions of the principles underlying these early actions or
analogous thereto. Thus, only those positive acts which
are wrongful because either intended or reasonably calcu-
lated to work harm would have been within the field of tort
liability. To understand how things so dissimilar in their.
nature came to be classified as mere branches of the same
species of liability, branches the distinction between which,
while often legally enforced, is but seldom definitely for-
mulated, certain things must be borne in mind. The com-
mon law is a thing of gradual growth, neither right nor
obligation was originally conceived as existing without a
remedy by some species of action to protect the one, some
legal process to enforce the other. There was no broad
theory or science of jurisprudence whereby rights and
obligations were ascertained and where ascertained protected
and enforced. Such classification as there has been in the
common law has therefore been along procedural lines
rather than in. accordance with the substantive nature of
rights and obligations.
The introduction of the writ of trespass upon the case
for the first time provided a flexible remedy designed appar-
ently merely to supplement the rigid formed writs of tres-
pass and to extend the protection of the law to closely
analogous situations. The poverty of remedial process led
to the scope of this action being enormously broadened.
So it came to be used to enforce every species of legally
recognized duty to protect every kind of legally recognized
right for which no precisely applicable writ could be found
or where the appropriate writ had unduly burdensome proce
dural incidents. Another influence led to the free use by the
courts of this new remedy. In few if any of the early
formed writs was trial by jury demandable as of right. In
this new action it was. The policy of the courts to en-
courage trials by jury to the exclusion of the earlier forms
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of trials by battle, by oath and by compurjuration they naturl
ally, wherevef possible, aliowed this new action to be brought
in lieu of the old.
In 1537, some two hundred and fifty years after the
introduction of this writ, Sir Anthony Fitzherbert, in his
treatise de Natura Brevitun. the earliest authoritative
abridgment of the common law gives a list of the then
known actions on the case. There is no attempt at classifica-
tion, but on analysis they will be found to fall into certain
definite classes.
i. Cases illustrating what may be termed the primary
use of the writ-the normal extension of the principles un-
derlying the formed writs of trespass to conditions closely
analogous to those for which remedy was given by such
writs, but where one or another of the precise technical
requirements for the operation of such writs being lacking
no redress was possible under them: (a) either because the
harm resulted indirectly and not directly as required in
trespass vi et armis, or (b) the property which was destroyed
had been given to the defendant and not taken from the
possession of the plaintiff as required in trespass de bonis as-
portatis, or (c) the prbperty invaded was not within the pro-
tection of the writ of trespass quare clausum fregit; being
a term of years or a franchise.
2. The second class of case deals with the secondary
use of the writ the use of it, not to extend trespass but to
enforce duties and obligations having no kinship to trespass
or at best only a remote analogy. These again fall into
two distinct groups. A. Those which deal with certain
positive duties, obligatioi.s to act affirmatively: Where
the only injury sustained is the loss of the.benefit which
would have been derived from the proper performance of
the duty; where the only right invaded is the right to the
beneficial fulfillment of the obligation. These cases stand
at the very opposite pole from those just discussed in which
there is a mere extension of the field of punishable miscon-
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duct. There is here no element of personal guilt.8  While
the word "ncyligentia" is used, it does not signify negli-
gence in the modern sense of the personal breach of social
duty. It is the mere failure, from whatsoever cause, to
fulfill an obligation only satisfied by performance that is
the basis of recovery. Of these Fitzberbert gives several
instances; one group, and that the earliest, are those at-
tached by custom as an incident to the tenure of a particular
estate or the incumbency of an office. A second group
are those which in the modern classification of the common
law are segregated into a distinct class, and treated as the
very antitheses of tort liabilities. These are the modern
contractual obligations; duties having as their basis the con-
sent of those who assume them. As instances of these are
given cases of warranties and the case of one who having
promised to build certain wagons and having been paid the
price fails to do so; the damage laid being the loss of their
profitable use. To Fitzherbert these appear to differ in noth-
ing substantial from similar positive obligations annexed
by custom to the tenure of real estate. Evidently the time
has not yet come when the fact that such obligations rest not
on custom or some general policy of law, but upon the ex-
pressed consent of the individual, serves to mark them as
radically different from all other positive obligations.
B. A class of case is given lying, it may be said, midway
between the new broader conception of trespass and positive
obligations. These contain the germ and root from which
has developed modern social duty to act, if one acts at all,
with due regard for the safety of others, and in relations
consciously assumed to take precautions to provide for the
safety of those with whom one is thereby associated. In
Fitzherbert this idea exhibits itself in a duty of proper
'So. in Yelding v. Fay (1596), Moore, 355, it was held that a plea ot
not guilty to a declaration alleging that by the custom of a certain
parish the incumbent was obliged to keep a bull and a boar for the
use of the parishioners, and had failed to do so, was bad; for the only
offense and wrong is the non-feasance of a thing, and the defendant
should allege performance, or deny the custom as raising the duty.
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performance recognized as attaching to the exercise of cer-
tain trades and calling; many of them the p.rototypes of
modern public or quasi public-service trades. These duties
are of var-ing degrees of stringency. In the case of inn-
keepers the obligation approaches the absolute duty of afford-
ing full protection to the guest and his property. In other
cases, as that of carpenters or farriers, the duty is rather
that of care in the conduct of the business to secure., the
safety of its patrons.
While there is nothing novel in the cases given by Fitz-
herhert his treatment of them is instructive as showing the
attitude of legal thought at that period and the pronounced
tendency to group all rights and obligations into a class
determined solely by the remedy applicable thereto. The.
extraordinary thing is the persistence of this tendency which
has led to the retention in the law of Tort of these radically
differing obligations. If, however, all the varying rights and
obligations being redressable by the same writ are to be
considered as substantially similar in their nature it is not
strange that they should be all considered to be tort-civil
wrongs. Not only was the writ both in name and in many
of it attributes-for one the fine payable to the crown-
punitive in its nature, but its primary and most conspicuous
use was in the development of the idea of civil wrong from
a mere series of specific acts of violence to a broad con-
ception requiring abstention from all acts intended or likely
to work harm. Only the novelty of the idea that legal duties
could be created solely by the consent of the individual with-
out the aid of custom or policy of law; the influence of the
civil law and its conception of a consensual agreement as a
distinct mental entity, and the great and rapidly growing im-
portance of contractual rights and duties in a community
where business and commerce was becoming of paramount
importance, served to extricate consensual obligations, them-
selves the last to find recognition in the common law, from
classification with the other affirmative obligations as a mere
branch of the law of torts, and place them in a distinct cate-
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gory as contracts. No such influence was at work to extricate
the residue of positive obligations, they were of small impor-
tance, of rare occurrence, and so they remain to-day a little
understood and disturbing anomaly in the body of the law
of tort. Were it possible to rearrange and reclassify com-
mon law liabilities and duties one might place all obliga-
tions to act in a class 0 distinct from the obligations to
refrain from injurious actions (if this indeed be the proper
conception of tort liability). While such an attempt would,
at this date, savor of mere theory and useless affectation, it is
quite possible to segregate such positive obligations as re-
main after the removal of those based solely on the consent
of the individuals into a distinct class of tort obligation.
This class is composed of certain distinct groups: First,
those obligations expressly created by statute, in which the
extent of the obligation depends entirely upon the intent
of the legislative body which enacts the statute. Second,
those arising out of the family relation. Third, those at-
tached by custom as an incident to the tenure of real estate,
or the incumbency of some office. Fourth, those annexed
by the policy of the law as necessary incidents to a rela-
tion voluntarily assumed, normally varying in extent as the
relation is gratuitous or beneficial to him on whom the
obligation is laid.
' Under such a classification contracts would form but one of the sub-
'divisions into which from their varying origins such obligations would
be divided. One, it is true, of an importance overshadowing all the
rest and, owing to its origin in individual consent rather than custom
or policy of the law, differing radically in its legal incidents from the
others. Thus, it creates rights and obligations only as between the
parties to it; the obligation is absolute to perform the thing promised;
no principle of justice or public policy reqtires that duties freely and
voluntarily assumed should be satisfied by anything short of full per-
formance, while where by the policy of the law a burdensome duty has
been imposed it is customarily held that all that can be asked is that care
shall be taken to secure performance; one violating a contractual obli-
gation is liable only for those consequences of it which are also prob-
able when it is assumed. In these respects it so radically differs from
other positive obligations that it may well be that even in a new classi-
fication that contractual obligations should be placed in a class by them-
selves.
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The first class requires but little attention. There can be
no question that the Sovereign, the State speaking through
its legislative branch, may in the absence of any Constitu-
tional prohibition impose such obligations as it may please
upon its subjects or citizens to secure the safety of their
fellows. The sole problem, and it is .by no means in all
cases a simple one, is to ascertain the actual intent of the
Legislature as expressed in its act.
There is perhaps some doubt as to the existence in tile
early common law of any legal duty arising out of family
relation and owed by the one member to another. Black-
stone it is true asserts positively that such duties exist but lie
asserts it so broadly, including, as he does, duties such as that
of education which have never been recognized as having
legal existence, that it is doubtful whether lie is not speak-
ing of a moral and ethical duty rather than a strictly legal
one. However, the great weight of modern authority is in
favor of the existence of a legal duty resting upon a father
or husband to provide the necessaries of life to his chil-
dren or wife. Whether these necessities of life include medi-
cal assistance is perhaps doubtful,"' but, admitting the exist-
ence of the duty in its broadest scope, it is. predicated upon
the ability of the one upon whom the duty is alleged to rest
to afford the necessary protection and the dependence and
helplessness of him who claims that the duty is owing to
him. It is certain also that the family relation must
exist; neither mere association without such relation nor a
meritricious relationship creates such a duty."1 Nor have
the obligations incident to family relationship generally been
See Coleridge, C. J., in Rcg. v. Downes, 13 Cox, C. C. III. It is
probable, however, that the doubt which be expresses is as to the nature
of the duty rather than as to its existence; whether the duty is one to act
bona fide, with good intentions, or to act as a normal man would act, or
is absolute to provide medical aid if possible. The actual point in the
case was -whether the accused's religious scruples against giving of medi-
cine would afford a defence where death resulted from .a failure to
provide medical assistance.
u Beardslcy v. State, 113 N. W. 1128 (Mich.), tgo8.
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extended beyond the definite limits of furnishing necessaries
of life.1
2
The duties incident to the tenure of real property, either
by general or special custom, and to the incumbency of
office, are for the purposes of this article of small moment.
An occupant of real property is bound at the least to see that
care is taken in the maintenance and construi:tion of all arti-
ficial structures and conditions upon his land, that they shall
not become a source of injury, either permanently or in some
particular occasion, to those who, as abutting property
owners or persons using adjacent highways, are forced in
the exercise of their own independent rights into contact
with the property. The duty goes no further than to afford
to such persons this species of protection. This lies ex-
clusively within the power of the occupant, he having the
exclusive control of the premises; as to this, the abutting
owner or wayfarer, being helpless to protect himself, must
and is allowed to rely upon the occupant. But there is no
general entrusting of the wayfarer or of the adjacent prop-
erty owners, persons or property to the land owner's care,
and therefore nothing out of which a general duty of
protection can arise. None the less, the duty, in so far as it
goes, has all the attributes of positive obligation. It is
' One can hardly help suspecting that the interest of the State in
seeing that it should not be unduly burdened with the support of those
whose own family were able to support them has had much to do with
the legal recognition of these duties. Certainly the numerous statutes
passed giving to the State the right to enforce the duty of the head of
a family to care for its members in relief of the burden imposed upon
the State in caring for those whose families have neglected them has
tended to define and possibly to restrict the extent of those duties. A
larger duty of protection is enforced in the case of the Territory v.
Manton. 7 Mont., 162; 8 Mont., 85. The defendant was convicted of
the inanslaughter of his wife upon the following facts: The two having
got drunk together in a neighboring town, walked back to their farm.
some miles away. The wife in her drunkenness fell some hundred feet
from the house, and was allowed by her husband, who was also-drunk,
to remain in the snow all night without any effort to save her, though
he could readily have done so. This case goes to the extent of recog-
nizing that a husband at least owes a duty to take active steps to rescue
his wife from a position of peril into which she had fallen, either by
mischance or from her own misconduct.
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one which is not satisfied by mere personal care to secure
safe repair. While it is doubtful whether the obligation has
preserved its early absolute character as exhibited in the
cases given by Fitzherbert; 13 whether or not it is the
landlord's absolute duty to maintain his property in good
repair, it is at least certain that he is bound to see that
care be taken to ascertain the necessity for repair, and to
have such repairs as may be necessary carefully made. And
this duty is one which he cannot delegate to an independent
contractor or any other person so as to escape responsibility
if the requisite care is not exercised in these particulars.
Duties annexed by policy of law or custom to relations
voluntarily assumed occupy the most important field and
afford the most difficult problems both in theory and-in
practice. In some respects they closely resemble contract-
while not expressly assumed, but imposed by law, they are
only imposed upon and as an incident to relations voluntarily
and consciously entered into; volition at some stage is essen-
tial. In consequence of this apparent kinship to contract,
and of the fact that many of the relations to which they
are attached are themselves the creatures of some contract,
the position in the common law of these obligations has been
highly uncertain. At one time the idea was prevalent and
is by no means even yet extinct, that where the relation was
contractual in its origin the obligations legally attached
thereto arose out of a tacitly recognized implied term of the
contract itself.14 Where, however, the relation existed in
the absence of contract, or where though such a contract ex-
isted, the person injured was not party to it, it was evident
that there murt he some basis, other than that of contract,
upon which the duty must rest, if it existed, as it admittedly
did in such cases. The present tendency is to recognize such
duties as in all cases arising out of the relation by reason of
"Ante, p. 224. And in Yelding v. Fay, :5g6 'Moore, 355, supra, p. 224,
note &
"The idea being in effect this: that since every man is taken to
know the law, if he agrees to assume a relation, he agrees to conform
to all the legal incidents thereof.
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some policy of law, and as based solely upon the consent of
him upon whom they are laid.
It would be impossible to set down at length all the rela-
tions to whlch this duty attaches. Among the more usual
and important are: First, the exercise of trades, businesses,
and professions.' 5 Second, the use for one's own purposes
of real and personal property. Third, the relation of master
and servant.
These duties vary as the business is public, one to whose
services every one of the public is of right entitled and
where safety of the whole public is dependent on the care
with which it is organized and conducted; or private where
the right to become its patron is a matter of private bar-
gain and its proper conduct affects only those bargaining to
receive its services.1" It reaches its highest exhibition where
for reward services are tendered or the use of property
offered to the public or such of them as may choose to avail
themselves thereof, and where the safety of the public in per-
son and property will be imperiled unless care is taken. As
where one of the early recognized public employments, such
as that of innkeeper, carrier, or the like, or one of their
modern derivatives, a business carried on under a public
franchise and given special rights because of its benefit to the
community, is being exercised, or, where some premises is
offered as a place of public resort.
This duty was early recognized, and while, perhaps, not fully
developed in the modern cases so as to adequately carry the principles
of the earlier cases to their logical conclusion under the changed condi-
tions of modern life, it is still one which has obtained general recogni-
tion.
" It may well be that the distinction between public and private
business lies primarily in this. In a public busin.ss, one held open for
the accommodation of all, where all must be equally served, every
member of the public has a right to acconmodation, and is entitled to
presume that the business has been carefully organized and conducted
with a view to his safety, whereas in purely private business there is no
right on any one's part to accommodation; it is entirely a matter lying
in private bargain, and the patron can make what terms he please for
his own protection, just as a vendee could protect himself, and was
originally required to protect himself, by appropriate warranties.
AS A BASIS OF TORT LIABILITY 231
The duty on the other hand sinks to a minimum where
the relation is wholly gratuitous, where some service is ren-
dered or property allowed to be used purely as a matter of
accommodation to another, and where such service is not
rendered as an incident to a profession or business in general
carried on for profit, and from the careless exercise of which
great injury to human life is probable. In such cases good
faith and fair dealing are alone required-full disclosure of
the dangers actually known to exist in the property gratu-
itously offered for another's use."7
In the intermediate class of case where a private busi-
ness is carried on for gain, or premises used for the private
business purposes of the occupant, there is also a duty to
use due care to secure the safety of the patron -in those
particulars as to which the defendant has exclusive control.
So, it is the owner's duty to see that care is taken to ascer-
tain the true nature and condition of his premises and to
make the actual condition conform to the apparent condition
by either repairing the defect discovered so as to make it
as good as it looks, or by giving notice of the defect so as
to show it to be as bad as it is. 0
These duties varying as they do among themselves in
extent, and differing from other positive obligations in
those incidents peculiar to their particular origin, all require
certain basic conditions for their existence and possess cer-
tain attributes common to all positive obligations. First, the
"' However, it is doubtful if property be even gratuitously supplied.
known to contain a latent defect whether it is not the supplier's duty
to see that notice of such defects is brought hom to the user, and
whether he could free himself from this liability by entrusting it to an
independent contractor or utter stranger. Such cases would be of rare
occurrence, for it is very unusual that an owner who allows persons to
gratuitously use his premises entrusts the giving of notice to any one
other than a servant of his own; whose neglect, of course, is legally
equivalent to the personal neglect of his master.
"And there is a marked tendency to hold that this duty is one
which cannot be delegated; that it is to see that care is taken by whomso-
ever the task of inspection or repairing or constructing the premises is
entrusted to, that it shall contain no hidden defect. Mulchy v. Congre-
gation, 125 Mass., 87; Stevens v. Company, -3 N. H., i59.
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duty of care is predicated upon the ability of the one to af-
ford protection and the helpless inability of the other to
protect himself; and his consequent necessary dependence
and reliance upon his associates' care. Second, these duties
usually, though perhaps not universally, exhibit that char-
acteristic incident of the earlier positive duties--the require-
ment of something more than mere personal good conduct, a
liability dependent upon the non-performance of the obliga-
tion to whatever extent it may exist.1 9
11It may, however, be said, that the tendency of modern legal
thought is to mitigate the rigor of these positive duties. The earliest
duties appear to have been quite as absolute as modern contract obliga-
tions. Those attached to the earliest recognized public employments
such as inn-keeper and carriers must be performed unless prevented by
some force overpowering in its nature, such as the act of God or the
King's enemies. Just as the tendency has been to restrict by legislation
or to allow the restriction by the agreement of the parties of these strin-
gent duties, so, in the newer relations, the tendency has bcen to allow
him upon whom the duty is laid to absolve himself by showing that all
care has been taken by whomsoever the performance of the duty has.
been entrusted to, to procure its proper performance. So, the duty
annexed to such new relation is not so much to make the premises or
business safe as to answer that care has been taken to secure safety.
There also appears a reluctance to extend even this duty to all situa-
tions where a consistent logical application of the underlying principles
would seem to require it.
It is difficult to see any logical distinction between the facts in the
case of Francis v. Cockrell, L R. 5, Q. B. 184, 5oT, where it was held
that the stewards of a race meeting were liable for the injuries re-
ceived by a ticket holder through the fall of a grandstand, though it had
been constructed by an admittedly competent independent contractor, and
the stiwards themselves were in no fault, and in the case of Searle v.
Luzverick, L. R. 9, Q. B. 122, where it was held that a livery stable keeper
was not liable to a customer whose carriage was destroyed by the fall
of a coach-house erected upon his premises by a competent independent
contractor employed by him. The reason given, that in the average
case livery men rent their premises and therefore a customer can only
expect of them careful selection and inspection of the premises in.
which they do business, seems unsatisfactory. For in this case it was
constructed at the instance of the defendant upon his own premises
expressly for use as a coach-house, and there would seem no good
reason why general conditions should control, when in fact it appears
that the actual conditions are exceptional. There would seem to be no
greater ability on the part of the stewards than on that of the liveryman
to secure a proper structure; nor would the public at a race meeting
have greater reason to expect that the stewards would personally erect
a grandstand than a customer that a stablekeeper would personally
build his own stable. The real effect of the two decisions seems to be
that the English courts are not prepared to recognize this stringent
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As to the first, it will be found that this duty, like all
other positive duties, arises only where the one party, having
exclusive control of the cause of harm, is able to afford
protection and the other, being by the very nature of the
relation prevented from protecting himself, must look
solely for his safety to his associate. And here it is to be
borne in mind that the common law requires impossibilities
of no man. It does not require care incompatible with
the proper exercise of the business conducted.2 0  Nor
does it ask that precaution shall be taken to provide
against merely possible but unusual and improbable mis-
chances.'" These duties, being both abnormal and onerous.
arise only where necessary for the protection of those unable
to protect themselves, and extends no further than to secure
protection against probable dangers wholly out of the con-
trol of such other. Where the relation is wholly volun-
tary on both sides, even if beneficial to him who offers it,
nothing more can be asked than a full disclosure of the true
conditions under which it is to be maintained. The other
may protect himself, without foregoing the exercise of any
legal right, by refusing to enter the relation or by withdra,,V-
ing from it.
In nolie of these relations is the one party made the
guardian of the general well-being of the other. The
duty extends only to take care as to those things which from
the very nature of the relation must be in the exclusive power
and control of the defendant, and as to which the plaintiff
liability, practically that which a carrier owes to its passengers, save
where the public are for the defendant's purposes induced to trust
their persons to his care, as a passenger entrusts his safety to his
carrier, and where some temporary structure is erected for immediate
public use.
" As was said by Lord Holt in his celebrated opinion in Coggs v.
Bernard, 2 Lord Raymond, 717-719, in which for the first time an
attempt was made to systematize the English law dealing with that
conspicuous vohlntary relation of bailor and bailee, and in which much
of the civil law learning was imported into the body of common law,
"it would be unreasonable to charge" a bailiff or factor "with a trust
further than the nature of the case puts it in his power to perform."
' See Stager v. Troy Laundry Co., 38 Oregon, 480; infra, p. 24o, note
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must look for his safety solely to him. Even a carrier owes
no duty to its passenger to protect him from all injuries or
to remove him from every perilous situation into which he
may fall while en route, nor to care for him if injured by
a cause unconnected with the means of transportation.
22
While it is bound to take care to operate its business so as
to not to expose its passengers unnecessarily to dangers of
which it is aware whether proceeding from the acts of the
company itself, or of its patrons 23 or even of strangers; 24
this is because the passenger, by placing himself in tile
charge of the company, confined by the very necessities of
the transportation to its car, and being in effect imprisoned
therein has no power to avoid such dangers, and must
look to his carrier to keep him out of range of them. But
the carrier owes no duty to provide medical attendance to an
ill passenger 24a or clothes to ill-clothed, or food to one who
" In Prespcrt v. R. R., 67 AtI. Rep., 522 (R. I. i9o7), it was held
that a carrier's duty to its passenger does not include an obligation to
supply them with shelter when exposed to cold by reason of an
unavoidable delay in transportation, and that it was not liable to a
passenger in a car stalled for many hours by the snow or a failure of
its conductor to obtain fox her and her infant child shelter in some
adjacent farmhouse.
" Kennedy v. R. R., 32 Pa. Sup. Ct, 623.
' Dufurr v. R. R., 75 Vt., i65.
"a See R. R. v. Sathamn, 42 Miss., 6o7, pp. 612, 613. If passen-
gers are when they embark "through illness incapable of taking care of
themselves, they should have attendants along to care for them." See,
also, B. & 0. R. R. v. Wooduard, 41 Md., 268, p. 29o. In A., T. & S. F.
R. R. v. lVeber, 33 Kans., 543, it is intimated that if a-passenger becomes
sick while cn route the carrier owes him a duty to remove him from its
train and to care for him until he can be turned over to the public
authorities charged with the care of the helpless sick. This, however,
was in the particular case, merely dictum, the actual decision being that
while the carrier has a right to eject a passenger so drunk as to be
offensive to his fellow-passenger, in so doing it must not expose him to
unnecessary peril by leaving him helpless in a dangerous place, or
exposed to the elements till the proper public ofcers arrive. In many
respects the case resembles Fluteau v. Dupue, lii N. W., i, and Wey-
mire v. l'olfe, 52 Iowa, 533, where it was held that neither an ill guest
nor a drunken patron should be sent helpless out into the cold. If a
passenger is palpably ill, or even drunk, the company is bound to exer-
cise in its operation care proportionate to his helplessness to protect
him from injury therefrom, Whcler v. R. R., 7o N. H., 6o7, and it may
well be that even if the passenger is not offensive to his fellow-passen-
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improvidently starts upon a long journey insufficiently sup-
plied. all these matters bLing usually within the power of the
passenger. A striking instance of this principle is the
divergent liability for the loss of a passenger's baggage
turned over to the company's extusive care, where its
liability is practically that of insurer, and for the loss of
baggage retained in the passenger's personal custody, which
attaches only where some defect in the company's plant or
operations has caused injury to it. So, it has been held
that a railroad company is not bound to stop its train to
recover a bag of jewels retained in a passenger's custody
which falls from a window of its car without fault on its
part.2
This principle appears perhaps most strikingly in the
duties attaching to the relation of master and servant. This
relation is voluntary on both sides and is for the benefit of
both. The master's duty extends no further than to take
care not to expose the servant to unnecessary risks- from
sources over which the master having exclusive control has
the sole ability to protect the servant, and, from which the
servant, being ignorant of the true condition of affairs, is
unable to protect himself by withdrawing from the service.26
He must provide and prepare as to those matters within
his exclusive control a business as safe as it appears to be.
The master's duty in this respect is usually said to com-
prise only certain definite duties, these (I) of supplying
safe tools and appliances; (2) a safe place to work; (3)
a sufficiency of not obviously incompetent fellow-servants;
(4) a safe system of rules and regulations where the
complicated nature of the business makes it necessary for
gers, the company may still, to relieve itself from this burden, which
may well be one incompatible with the proper operation of its business,
remove him from its train. But if they do so, they are of course bound
to exercise care not to cause him unnecessary peril or exposure.
Henderson v. R. R., 122 U. S., 6z.
'We must keep constantly in mind one principle peculiar to this
relation. The business being one operated for the joint benefit of both
master and servant, the master is not responsible for its negligent
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the servant's protection, and (5) in many jurisdictions
aUnlHe by conlniun law and some by statute, efficient superin-
tendence. These, however, are but the more usual instances
of the application of the general principle which requires
from the one, able to afford it, protection to the other in-
competent to protect himself. These are the usual things
over which the master has the exclusive control and the sole
power to make safe; the servant if ignorant of the defects
therein being unable to protect himself by withdrawing from
the employment, and by the very nature of the employment
being forced to take and use what the master provides him
and so to look solely to his master's care in these particulars
for his safety.
It would seem therefore to be erroneous to regard these
enumerated duties as the sole duiies owed by the master,
and to refuse to recognize the existence of any further
duty unless it can be brought by some strained reason-
ing within the terms of one of them. On the contrary,
it would appear that wherever, from the peculiar nature
of the business the servant must rely exclusively for his
safety upon the master's care, in any particular, even
though it falls outside of these well defined duties, there
does exist a duty on the master's part to take care for
the servant's safety in these respects. So, while it is not
normally the master's duty to furnish food or clothing to
a servant, or to render him medical assistance and while,
operation by those to whom he entrusts it in the absence of personal
misconduct on his own part. A servant injured by the negligence of a
fellow servant in the operation and not the preparation of a business
has, therefore, no right of action against his master. But the prepara-
tion of the business being wholly within the power of the master, he is
bound to see to it that care is taken to provide a business as least as
safe as it appears to be. This obligation has also this anomalous
feature among positive duties. While it cannot be delegated to a
servant of the master, or to a special branch of his business which is
devoted to its performance, so as to escape liability for its non-perform-
ance, it may be entrusted to a competent independent contractor where
the thing to be provided as a matter of preparation of a safe business is
one which is ordinarily left by the average man to independent con-
tractors.
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in general, even a contract to do so will not give the servant
the right of action for injuries sustained through the lack
thereof; this is only because there is nothing in the nature
of the ordinary empllovnent to prevent the servant fron be-
ing just as capable, save for the difference in financial
position (which the common law regards as of no moment)
to supply himself as the master is to supply him. But, it
may well be that the nature of some particular employment
may require the servant to trust himself in these particulars
to his master's care just as in general lie must rely upon
it in respect to the character of the tools which he uses.
Out of just such a situation has arisen the duty recognized
in the maritime law as resting upon a vessel and its owner
to provide sufficient food, and in America at least, medical
attendance to its seamen.27  And the reason given is that
the very nature of their employment causes them to be dur-
ing the voyage entirely tinder the control and at the mercy of
the master of the vessel, and to visit foreign ports where if
cast adrift ill and without resources and very possibly igno-
rant of the language, they would be utterly helpless, while
the master is able to cause the sailor to be properly cared
for. There appears to be recognized a further duty on the
part of a ship to its sailors, to make all reasonable efforts to
rescue them if they fall overboard from any cause whatso-
ever.2 8 And it would appear that this is a not improper ex-
tension of the ship's duty. The very nature of the employ-
ment is one subjecting the sailor to grave risk of just such
peril, and his helplessness and the master's ability to pro-
tect him, is manifest.
Now, while the maritime law in many respects differs
from the common law, and the existence of a duty recog-
nized by the one is not an authority for its existence in
So, in Scarf v. Metcalf, 1O7 N. Y., 211, it was held tl.,t an action
lay by a sailor.against the owner of his ship where his injuries had
been greatly aggravated by the captain's failure to provide proper medi-
cal attendance.
"See Field, J., in charging the jury in U. S. v. Knoles, 4 Sawyer
(U. S.), 5T7.
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the other, none the less that where the nature of the em-
ployment though on land is similar in its attributes to that
of a sailor where there exists the same isolation, the same
expectable inability on the part of the servant to provide for
himself, the same complete dependence upon the care of the
master and the same risk of illness or injury inherent in the
very nature of the employment it would seem that the gen-
eral principles governing the duty of a master to his ser-
vant (of which the duty to provide safe tools, etc., are but
instances) demands that the common law should equally
with the maritime law recognize the duty of a master to
feed, clothe, and provide his servant with necessary medical
attendance. And it is submitted that the cases tend to sup-
port under appropriate circumstances the existence of such
a duty, at least to the extent of supplying proper food and
lodging. While it is held in R. v. Smith,2 9 that a master is
not guilty of manslaughter in failing to supply food and
lodging to a servant who was sui juris and was free to
leave the master's house and was not coerced by threats
or ill treatment to remain, it is otherwise where the ser-
vant is so reduced in mind and body as to be within the
entire control of the master, or where the servant, being
of tender age, is equally under the master's dominion.80
And one who imprisons another, though legally, is bound
to provide his prisoner with necessaries.31
So, where the nature of the employment is for any cause,
as for instance its isolation, its distance from any place
where the servant can be expected to be able to supply him-
self, is such that it is evident that he must look solely to his
master for food or lodging many cases recognize the mas-
ter's duty to provide them for him.
32
1o Cox, C. C., 82.
R. v. Ridley, 2 Campb., .645.
R. v. Edwards, 8 C. & P., 61r.
' In Shoemaker v. R. R., 46 Minn., 39, it was held that a railroad
company having sent a gang of men out to an isolated point in very
cold weather was bound to provide them with transportation to some
point where they could provide food and shelter for themselves. So,
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The duty of a master to supply medical or surgical aid
seems to be even more doubtful.33  In Wcnnall v. Abney,"
it was laid down broadly that a master is not, in the absence
of contract, bound to supply medical attendance for even
his domestic servant, the case was one where an action
was brought against the master to recover for medical
attendance furnished the servant. One reason given for
denying the master's liability was that it would be highly
and unnecessarily onerous to require one, who was obliged
by the necessities of his trade to hire a servant for a very
small wage, to be subject to a contingent liability, en-
tirely beyond his ability to bear, for the cost of effecting
a cure of some serious disorder entailing large expense.
in Clifford v. R. R., 9 Col., 333, it was held that where a man was em-
ployed to work at an isolated point, the master was liable in an action
of tort for a failure to supply suitable food and lodging. True, the
contract specified that the master engaged to supply these, but had the
servant been able to supply himself and not wholly dependent upon his
master, in view of the nature of his employment, even in an action
upon the contract, he could not have recovered for more than the costs
to which he had been put in procuring them. The contract, in a word,
merely showed that the servant was entitled to rely upon his master in
these particulars. So, in Hyatt v. R. R., ig Mo. App., 287, it was held
that where a gang of men had been sent out to shoved snow drifts, and
one of them was frozen, owing to a failure to send out a heated car
as a shelter, as the superintendent had promised, a recovery might be
had. The superintendent's promise did not amount to an actual con-
tract; it was at best a mere assurance that the car would be sent. It
gave the servant reason to work on, relying upon that his master would
afford him the protection necessary to make his work safe, and removed
all ground for claiming that the servant had assumed the risk, knowing
that he must look out for himself. The case is, therefore, in line with
those where a servant, thotugh knowing that a tool or appliance is
defective, continues to use it upon his master's assurance that it will be
repaired. In King r. R. R., 23 R. I., 583, it was, however, held that a
railroad company was not liable to provide sufficient clothing to onewhora
it sent out to shovel snow at a point remote from human habitation.
Here, however, the servant knowing the work he was expected to do,
the place where he was expected to perform it, and the severe weather
then prevailing, could have protected himself. He knew the conditions
and could have dressed himself accordingly, or if he had not the means
to afford proper clothing, he could have refused to work, or insisted
upon his master supplying him with the necessary clothing.
Compare as to this the doubt as to any such duty as arising out of
family relationship. Ante, p.
'3 Bos. & P., 247.
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Here, however, the servant who was injured in his nias-
ter's service was taken to his mother's house and there
treated by the plaintiff and there was no doubt but that had
the mother been unable to care for her son she could have
obtained medical attendance from the parish. The servant
was therefore neither by the very nature of his employment
nor under the circumstances of the particular acgident neces-
sarily forced to look for such aid to his master alone, who
was in fact not even present when the injury was received.
When, however, the servant is employed to do hazardous
work in a place or under circumstances making it evident
that lie must look solely to his master for such immediate
and urgently required care and attention as can only be
rendered on the spot, it is held in Early v. R. R.35 and Shaw
v. R. R.,36 that it is the duty of the master's representative
upon the spot to make a bona fide. effort to relieve him.
This duty so closely akin to that owed by a ship to its sea-
man and existing where the employment is closely analogous
in its incidents to that of a sailor on a voyage, arises only
out of absolute necessity. It would not exist when as in
lVennall v. Abney, the servant though injured could provide
medical aid for himself or could turn to relief to the public
authorities primarily charged with the care of the indigent
sick. It 'would arise out of the emergency and expire with it.
It would not require the master to support, care for and
provide medical attendance for his servant till cured. As it
would only bind the master only to render the servant such
immediate aid as was possible on the spot and transportation
to a point where he could be properly cared for, either by
himself, or by the public; nor would it require that a surgeon
should be maintained to treat such cases as they arose 7
M x5i Ind., 73-
"' 14 N. IV. (Mlinn., i9o7), 8_r,
'Stayer v. Troy Laundry Co., 38 Oregon, 48m "It is unusual to
anticipate accident and provide for the most speedy relief when such an
exigency arises." The master need do no more than provide for the
normal and expectable; he need not -anticipate and provide for the
merely possible but improbable.
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all that would be demanded would be such humane attention,
such "first aid to the injured" as could be expected from
the master or his representative upon the spot.
In King v. R. R.,38 it was, however, held that while the
conduct of a conductor of defendwnt in refusing to carry
home an employee whose feet had become frozen while
shoveling snow at an isolated point on its line, was, morally
speaking, highly reprehensible in a gross act of inhumanity,
the company owed no legal duty to him to transport him to a.
point where his injuies could receive attention.
Here it is necessary to discriminate between duties and
privileges. Between the right under the certain circum-
stances to act in a particular way, and the duty to do so.
No doubt a father may justify force in defence of his son;
a servant in defence of his master; a husband in defence of
his wife, and vicc versa. But while lie is privileged to inter-
fere for his son's or master's or wife's protection, lie is under
no legal duty to do so. No action has ever been maintained
against the cowardly servant, father, or husband, who ran
away when his master, son, or wife was attacked. So, while
it is constantly held that a man may justify taking very
considerable risks in order to save human life,39 none.the
less there appears to be no legal liability if he fails to do so.
40
It is important to bear this distinction in mind in con-
sidering another class of cases, those in which it is held that
a corporate agent may bind its principal for expenses in-
curred in aiding servants patrons, or strangers, who have
been injured by the innocent operation of its business. The
scope of a servant or agent's employment is by no means
limited to the performance of those acts which the em-
ployer is legally bound to do. Of course, if the act is one
which the employer is bound to have done, it will be in-
ferred that a servant performing it is authorized to do so.
23R. 1., 583.
, Eckert v. R. R.. 43 X. Y., 52; Corbin v. Ci!y, 195 Pa., 461.
"See Carpenter, C. J., Buch v. Armory Co., 69 N. H., 257.
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But there are many things which are. purely discretionary
with the master, but which may yet well fall within the*
siope of the servant's employment if they tend to Advance
the master's interests. It by no means follows, therefore,
that because a railroad is held liable to a physican em-
ployed by its conductor or other official representative to
render medical assistance to persons injured by its opera-
tion that the court is prepared to recognize that it is the com-
pany's duty to render such services.
So. while it is held in England that a general manager
has the power to bind a railway for its surgical attendance
furnished persons injured upon its lines,"' and that an
inspector whose duty it is to care for persons injured, by
its operations may pledge the credit of the company for
lodgings furnished to such persons at an inn,4 2 no English
case can be found holding the railway liable for a failure to
supply either medical attendance or lodgings to those inno-
cently injured by its operations. So, while it has been held
in Kansas that a division superintendent has authority to
provide medical attendance to a servant 43 though not to
provide similar services for a passenger 44 the existence of
any duty to care for those wlom one may innocently
" Walker v. R. R., L R., 2 Ex., 22&
'Langan v. R. R., 26 L T. N. S., 57"7.
" R. R. v. lVinterbothan, 52 Kan., 433.
" R. R. v. Batty, 35 Kan., 26_. It is difficult to see the force of the
distinction drawn between aid to a servant and to a passenger. The
reason given is that the master has an interest in preserving the health
of a skilled employee, but they have no similar interest in the health
of a passenger. This, however, seems to overlook the interest which the
company possesses in minimizing the injuries of its injured passengers,
and so reducing the amount of the damages recoverable if it turn out
that the railroad has been delinquent. Since the company's representa-
tive must act at once, he can hardly be asked to determine on the spot
whethei the accident renders the company liable or not, and he should
be, therefore, allowed a certain latitude of discretion as to whether it is
to the company's interest to aid the passenger. And the company's liabil-
ity should not be allowed to depend upon whether he turned out to be
right or wrong in his judgment. It would appear that a railroad is not
responsible for the acts of its train crew in their humane effort to relieve
the sufferings of an injured trespasser. The company owing no duty of
relief to trespassers, acts of the crew are done out of purely personal
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injure, or to remove them from a perilous situation in which
one has innocently placed them, is expressly denied in Cap-
pier v. R. R.
45
On the whole, it may be said that duties to take positive
action for the benefit and protection of others attach only
to certain relations; and are imposed only when absolutely
necessary for the protection of others and only to the ex-
tent generally necessary to afford them protection. Save
where the state has by legislative enactment imposed such
obligations, they do not exist, unless there be some family
relation; tenure or occupancy of real property, or the vol-
untary act of consciously entering into some relationship to
which such duties are attached because necessary for the
protection of one's associates. Even in the case of family
relationship there is present the will of the citizen to become
a husband or father, so that even here the relation is, in the
last analysis, the creature of voluntary action on his part.
The occupancy of real estate is. save perhaps in the case
where it comes into one's possession by inheritance, a con-
scious voluntary act.46  It is not too much to say therefore
that saving the case of an inherited estate, if indeed this be
an exception, no man can be saddled with a burden of posi-
tive action without some voluntary act on his part which ren-
ders him subject thereto. In addition it would appear that
save in the case of family relations, where the interest of the
state to avoid being unduly burdened with the support -of
those whose relations are able to care for them naturally
leads to the burden of the support of the members of a
family being placed upon its head, no obligation beyond that
of good faith and fair dealing is laid upon any individual
humanity and have no tendency to further the company's interests. So,
in Ollet v. the R. R.. 2o Pa., 36t, it was held that where a train crew
had taken a youthful trespasser against his protest to a hospital the
company was not liable to him in an action of false imprisonment.
"66 Kan, 649.
"It is perhaps possible even to presume a willingness to take the
benefit of an inheritance; at all events the estate at some period has
come into the line of descent by the voluntary act of some ancestor.
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unless he voluntarily occupies a relation materially bene-
ficial to him. Finally it may be said that these obligations
only attach where the one party, having exclusive control
of a condition, has the entire power to prevent harm arising
from it, and where the other, from the very nature of the
relation, must be altogether helpless and incapable of pro-
tecting himself, and so is forced to rely implicitly upon the
care of his associate for his safety.
Francis H. Bohlen.
(To be Continued.)
